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Abstract. This article describes psychological findings stemming from terror management theory that 
have relevance for case officer control of an intelligent agent. 
 
Terror management theory is founded on the premise that an awareness of mortality in conjunction 
with a motive for self-preservation creates the potential for psychological terror. As this awareness and 
this motive increase, so does the terror potential. The theory posits that an individual has two recourses 
to ward off or minimize the terror: (1) development and maintenance of a cultural worldview that 
provides meaning, values, order, and a sense of permanence permeated with the possibility of literal or 
symbolic immortality contingent on meeting or exceeding prescriptions and avoiding proscriptions and 
(2) development and maintenance of self-esteem stemming from believing that one is appropriately 
dealing with prescriptions and proscriptions. The theory also posits that mortality salience, e.g., 
reminders of mortality, increase the need for the above two recourses. 
 
Empirical and experimental findings generated from terror management theory--although obtained for 
populations outside the world of intelligence--seem very relevant for the intelligence case officer in 
controlling an agent. As mortality salience increases--a phenomenon that can be titrated by the case 
officer: (1) the agent may well increase positive evaluations of people who validate one's belief system 
and negative evaluations of those who threaten it. Here the case officer cannot only become more 
positively evaluated by the agent but foster negative evaluations of other people who may threaten or 
impede an intelligence operation. (2) The agent may increase ingroup bias, i.e., increase positive 
evaluations of ingroup versus outgroup characteristics. The case officer, then, can become more 
positively evaluated by the agent by reinforcing an ingroup identity--e.g., by emphasizing similarities 
between case officer characteristics and those forming ego-syntonic and ego ideal components of the 
agent. (3) The agent may increase perceived consensus for his or her own beliefs. The case officer can 
employ perceived consensus to attenuate the agent's doubt and intensify the agent's comfort and 
acceptability about the nature of the intelligence operation. (4) The agent may become more reluctant 
to violate cultural norms. Here, the case officer may induce the belief in the agent that actions taken 
that are seemingly not in the best interest of the agent's own country or organization are quite 
congruent with the country's or organizations norms. In fact, the actions are being taken only because 
leaders of the country or organization are themselves violating these norms, and the agent is merely 
trying to right a wrong or to act in his or her best interests after leaders have cancelled a moral or social 
contract through their own violation of norms. (5) The agent may increase physical (and psychological) 
distance from outgroup members. This phenomenon can mitigate operations and communications 
security concerns of the case officer. This phenomenon, however, also may impede an operation if 
physical distance must at times be minimized. Here, the case officer might want to implicitly train the 
agent in psychological distancing techniques to increase toleration for operationally required physical 
proximity to outgroup members. (6) The agent may lower the threshold for aggression against those 
who violate the agent's cultural world view. If properly managed, this can work in the case office's favor. 
If the case officer is unaware of this phenomenon, it can spell operational disaster. 
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Experienced case officers may view at least some of the above as supporting the lore of intelligence 
operations. More importantly, the development of terror management theory and the fostering of 
related empirical and experimental pursuits may lead to future operational successes that will correct 
and add to this lore. (See Arndt, J., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., & Simon, L. (1997). 
Suppression, accessibility of death-related thoughts, and cultural worldview defense: Exploring the 
psychodynamics of terror management. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 5-18; Becker, 
E. (1962). The birth and death of meaning. NY: Free Press; Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., & Solomon, S. 
(1986.) The causes and consequences of a need for self-esteem: A terror management theory. In R.F. 
Baumeister (Ed.), Public self and private self (pp. 189-212). NY: Springer-Verlag.) (Keywords: Intelligence, 
Terror.) 
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